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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RON DOUGHERTY and JUDITH A. 
DOUGHERTY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 13854 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case is one wherein the plaintiffs, Ron and 
Judith A. Dougherty, are seeking a money judgment against 
the defendant, California-Pacific Utilities Company, a 
public utility, for damages to plaintiffs1 culinary well 
and to the basement of their home and for the cost of 
hauling culinary water to their home, all of which alleg-
edly resulted from defendant's negligence in allowing water 
to overflow the banks of its canal during and following a 
severe rain and hailstorm. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaintiffs judgment against the defendant in the sum and 
amount of $896.27 and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial Court's 
judgment on the grounds that the Court erred as follows: 
1. In finding that defendant was negligent in the 
maintenance and operation of its canal; 
2. In finding that there was no contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs; and 
3. In finding that defendant's negligence proximately 
caused the damage complained of. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, California-Pacific Utilities Company, a 
public utility, formerly Southern Utah Power Company, owns, 
operates and maintains a hydro electric generating plant 
known as hydro plant No. 2, hereinafter referred to as the 
hydro plant, located in close proximity to the Santa Clara 
River near Veyo, Washington County, Utah. The water used to 
propel the turbines of hydro plant No. 2 is taken out of the 
Santa Clara River at a point upstream from the Baker Reservoir 
and conveyed some 3 to 4 miles by means of the No. 2 hydro 
canal, hereinafter referred to as the canal, down to the hydro 
plant where it runs through the generating plant and eventually 
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back into the Santa Clara River (Tr.. '. Hydro canal 
No, 2 is also owned/ operated and maintained by the defendant 
for the purposes aforesaj d. 
The canal was built in the year 1919 (Tr. 121) and has 
been i n regular use since that date* It was original] y con-
structed to accommodate the flow of 1 6 cubic feet per second 
of water, The canal had that same carrying capacity at the 
time of the damage complained of in this case, as it presently 
has (Tr. 6, 90, 96)* In fact, the diversion works located at 
the head of the canal on the Santa Clara River are constructed 
in such a fashion as to automatically allow up to a maximum 
of 16 second feet of water to enter the canal (Tr. 91, 96). 
The company's records indicate that since its construc-
tion the canal flov :\ai% wii.e^ • > *i
 t - se *u: * t, 
depending, naturally, i^: the amount. ;• ." vater flow x:r .icw : tT ^  
Santa C] ara R i ver { • ?t)• ine maximum flow gener?lly occurs 
in the spring., that i s, March through Apxi ] , wnxie ~he minimum 
flow occurs in July and August (Tr. 92, 93) . Although 3G 
second feet- of wat^r ", .- • ^ r' . '• ^ r-'f-pr'i ated by the defen-
dant for power generating purposes, only : '•-, second feet has 
ever been diverted specifically through No. 2 h\ ."::c "anal. 
Other por tions of tl la t tota ] appropr > v. \ OP f= i\'*s I <»: >jyod , 
however, in other canals operated by the defendant (Tr. 95, 9 6) . 
To achieve the highest possible degree of efficiency in 
generating elect r i c i ty, i 1: i s imp o i t ai 11 t h a - - ~<: i s * an t amo un t 
*Reference is hereby made to particular pages of the trans-
cript of the trial. 
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of water pressure be maintained as the water from the canal 
reaches the generator (Tr. 10). To that end, the proper 
amount of water must be transmitted through the canal to a 
forebay which maintains the water at a constant volume and 
transmits it down a long steel pipe, known as the penstock, 
wherein the proper pressure is achieved by the time the 
water reaches the generator. At least four control devices 
aid in achieving the proper pressure and water volume required. 
The first device, already referred to above, is at the point 
of diversion from the river and automatically allows up to 
a maximum of 16 second feet of water into the canal. The 
second device, located some considerable distance upstream 
from the plaintiffs1 property, is an overflow device and was 
installed above a certain point in the canal susceptible to 
ice jams. Said overflow permits water to escape from the 
canal at a point where no damage can be done in the event 
of an ice jam. On a very few occasions, the use of said 
overflow has been required (Tr. 11, 12, 24). The third 
device is located downstream from the plaintiffsf property 
and just above the forebay. It is constructed in such a 
fashion that a part of the device can be removed so as to 
allow all of the water to overflow harmlessly at that point 
in the event the screen in front of the penstock requires 
cleaning or if for some other reason it becomes desirable to 
prevent the flow of water into the generator. Said device 
also serves the vital function of keeping a constant volume 
of 16 second feet of water at the forebay (Tr. 23). In fact, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
the canal is so designed that water will overflow automati-
cally at said device (referred to as overflow No, 2 in the 
trial transcript) before backing up and overflowing at other 
places along the canal, including the vicinity of plaintiffs1 
property, if the fourth control device (infra) is completely 
shut off (Tr. 135, 159, 160). 
The fourth control device is the nozzle at the end of 
the penstock. The nozzle can be shut off completely, but 
it can be opened only to one-third capacity, or to an approx-
imate diameter of 10 inches (Tr. 99). As the volume of the 
water in the River and, consequently, in the canal decreases, 
such as in the late summer and fall, it is necessary to 
decrease the capacity of the nozzle accordingly to maintain 
the constant required pressure. 
Prior to October, 19 70, the plaintiffs had purchased 
approximately a half acre of land immediately east of the 
canal at a point approximately 2,000 feet upstream from and 
northeast of the forebay. The plaintiffs moved into a 
partially completed home, which they built on the property, 
sometime during the latter part of March, 19 71. They also 
completed the drilling of a culinary well, which went into 
operation at about the same time. Both the house and the 
well of the plaintiffs were constructed at an elevation well 
below that of the portion of the canal adjacent to the plain-
tiffs1 property. Plaintiffs were aware before they purchased 
the property that it was located on a down-hill slope from 
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the canal (Tr. 36, 37) . 
On August 8, 19 71, a severe rain and hailstorm occurred 
in the area through which the canal flows. The storm was of 
such intensity that in a period of approximately two hours, 
it deposited one and seventy-two hundredths inches of precipi-
tation in the general area of the canal (Tr. 15). 
Upon receiving word of the occurrence of the severe storm, 
Ivan Hunt, hydro foreman for the defendant, rushed to the area. 
Upon arrival at the hydro plant, he noticed hail approximately 
three inches deep, heavy rains melting the hail, and great quan-
tities of water flooding downhill and into the canal (Tr. 22, 23) . 
As a result of the tremendous quantities of flood water running 
into the canal from the sloped area west of the canal, water 
overflowed the eastern bank of the canal for nearly the entire 
length of said bank from the overflow below the plaintiffs1 
property to Branham's place above plaintiffs' property — a 
distance of approximately three-tenths to a quarter of a mile 
(Tr. 131). However, the bank itself remained intact (Tr. 131). 
The only three eyewitnesses to the storm who testified at the 
trial, Ivan Hunt, Elwin Hadley (both employees of defendant) 
and Ron Dougherty, all described the situation as "water running 
everywhere" (Tr. 41, 42, 129, 165). 
Immediately prior to the beginning of the storm, the 
defendant, Ron Dougherty, left his home and went to Brookside, 
approximately one-half mile northeast of his house, to help a 
friend start his automobile. Ron Dougherty testified at trial 
that although the storm was of the same intensity at Brookside 
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as at his own home, he waited at Brookside for the storm to 
subside rather than returning to his own house immediately 
(Tr. 40). Even though he saw great quantities of flood water 
running to each side of the road and a considerable amount of 
hail still on the ground, he did not pay too much attention 
until he got home (Tr. 41). Despite the fact that his culinary 
well had lain open and exposed to the elements since late March 
of that year (a period of over four months), he "did not pay 
too much attention" (Tr. 44, 132, 133). Although Mr. Dougherty 
testified that one could expect severe storms in the area of 
his house, he had not yet gotten around to sealing and capping 
the casing of his well (Tr. 44). The casing was a perforated 
type casing, and as of the date of the storm, the area around 
the upper part of the casing had remained unfilled. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DAMAGE 
COMPLAINED OF RESULTED FROM AN ACT OF GOD, NOT FROM DEFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE. 
(A) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT THE STORM OCCURRING ON AUGUST 8, 1971, WAS AN 
UNPRECEDENTED ACT OF GOD, FOR WHOSE CONSEQUENCES 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE. 
It is a well-settled rule of law in this state, as well 
as in most jurisdictions, that where a canal's overflowing occurs 
during a storm of such magnitude and severity as to be beyond 
the realm of reasonable foreseeability, and therefore beyond the 
ken of the traditional prudent man, negligence is non-existent 
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and no liability accrues against the owner of the canal for 
damages occurring to others by reason of such overflowing. 
Charvoz v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 120 Utah 480 (1951), 235 P.2d 
780; Lisonbee v. Monroe Irr. Co., 18 Utah 343, 54 P. 1009 (1898). 
Ivan Hunt, the defendant's hydro foreman, who was born 
and raised in the area of the hydroplant and canal (Tr. 29), 
reported having never before seen a storm in that area of such 
severity and magnitude (Tr. 15, 22, 24, 129). He testified, in 
fact, that the canal had never before overflowed because of rain 
water flowing into the canal (Tr. 130). Ron Dougherty, one of 
the plaintiffs, testified that he could not remember a previous 
storm in the area delivering a combination of as much rain and 
hail (Tr. 42). Jacob Jones, a former employee of the defendant, 
whose testimony was the most antagonistic toward the defendant, 
and who did not witness the storm (Tr. 70), testified that in 
the 2 8 years he had worked along the canal he had never before 
seen flooding of the canal at Dougherty's place (Tr. 78). 
The record shows that one and seventy-two hundredths inches 
of precipitation fell during a period of approximately two hours 
(Tr. 15). There is nothing particularly unusual about that amount 
of precipitation in that area during a 24-hour period. The un-
precedented characteristic of that particular storm, however, 
is that so much precipitation fell during such a short period 
of time. If that amount of precipitation had come gradually, it 
would have been absorbed into the ground. However, under the 
instant circumstances, the ground could not begin to absorb that 
excessive quantity of precipitation (Tr. 23). 
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Courts can distinguish an ordinary flood or storm from 
an extraordinary one by determining whether its occurrence 
and magnitude should or might have been anticipated by a person 
of reasonable prudence in view of the flood and storm history 
of the locality involved and existing conditions affecting the 
liklihood of flooding. Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816, (Oregon 
1952). Defendant submits that based on the evidence in the re-
cord and the tests which courts apply in determining what con-
stitutes an act of God, the instant storm and flooding were 
unforeseeable and constitute an act of God. 
POINT I (B) 
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS MAINTENANCE AND 
OPERATION OF ITS CANAL. 
Utah stands for the proposition that an owner of a canal 
is not an insurer against damages caused to others by the over-
flow of the canal's banks, but that the owner is liable only if 
it is negligent in the maintenance or operation of the canal. 
Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972); Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Hyland Rlty, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 341, 
334 P.2d 755 (1959). The trial court in the instant case made 
a finding that the failure of defendant's agent Ivan Hunt to 
reduce the volume of water in the canal by throwing open any or 
all of the control devices constitutes negligence of the defen-
dant. However, the law imposes upon a defendant a duty to act 
only under such circumstances where the plaintiff can show by 
its proof that damage or harm occurs to the plaintiff as a re-
sult of defendant's failure to act. In the instant case, Ivan 
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Hunt testified that he had intended to open at least one control 
device, but was dissuaded by his judgment that the damage, if 
any, had already occurred and that his act of opening the device 
would avail little or nothing. The record is devoid of any 
evidence that even if, arguendo, the opening of all the control 
devices would have completely drained the canal, such acts of 
the defendant would have prevented the damage complained of. The 
plaintiffs have simply failed to carry their burden of showing 
that their damage resulted from acts or failure to act on the 
part of the defendant. Even if, arguendo, reasonable minds 
could not differ that the complete opening of all the control 
devices would have substantially reduced the volume of water in 
the canal, one cannot merely assume, under the circumstances 
and the proof in this case, that the defendant, therefore, 
caused the damage to the plaintiffs. To sustain such a con-
clusion of the trial court is to relieve the plaintiffs of their 
burden of persuasion and to impose upon the defendant a theory 
of strict liability or res ipsa loquitur, contrary to the law. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THE PLAINTIFFS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
On August 8, 19 71, the defense of contributory negligence 
was still a valid defense under Utah law. The defense was not 
supplanted by the comparative Negligence Act until the year 19 73. 
Cf. Sections 78-27-37 to -43, U.C.A., (Supp. 1973). 
The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiffs knew of the 
location of the canal and of the fact that their property was on 
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a lower elevation than the canal long before they purchased the 
property and constructed their house and culinary well (Tr. 36, 37). 
However, by Ron Dougherty's own testimony, it is clear that he 
did not allow for any danger as to the location of the house and 
well (Tr. 38). The evidence further shows that plaintiffs1 
culinary well was in operation for a period of some four months 
prior to the instant storm and flooding. Ron Dougherty testified 
that he was in the process of sealing the well, but that it had 
not yet been completed. He testified at the trial (Tr. 44) that 
one could expect serious storms in his area; however, he had 
made little or no effort in four months to protect his well from 
the elements. He further testified that he had been told that 
some previous flooding had occurred and that a neighbor's rock 
work under his trailer had been washed out thereby (Tr. 42). 
However, such a report apparently caused him no concern as the 
evidence shows that he left his well open and unsealed for four 
months f time. 
On the day of the storm, despite the severity of the rain-
fall and hail which he observed and the heavy flooding which he 
saw, he lingered at a neighbor's house until the storm subsided, 
paying no attention to his house or well until he returned home 
(Tr. 41) . 
A recent Utah case, Erickson v. Bennion, cited supra, 
denied recovery to a plaintiff who failed to protect his home 
from flooding by run-off waters of the defendant. The court 
imposed a burden upon the plaintiff to provide a means of diver-
sion of the flooding waters away from his own property. Although Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the specific facts of the Erickson case and the instant case 
are not identical, the governing principles are. The plaintiffs 
in our case, by due diligence, could have prevented the injury 
to at least their well, which injury constitutes the substance 
of plaintiffs1 complaint. 
Both Ivan Hunt and Wallace Smith, defendant's agents, 
testified that on the day following the storm plaintiffsf well 
was open, unsealed and excavated below the level of the ground 
(Tr. 43-45, 94) and susceptible to rain and storm waters. Under 
all these circumstances, the trial court's failure to find the 
plaintiffs contributorily negligent is reversible error. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S NEGLI-
GENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF. 
The record fails to prove that it was, in fact, the water 
that overflowed the canal bank which caused the plaintiffs' 
injury, and not the torrential rain and hail storm itself. Had 
the canal not existed at all, the evidence is conclusive that 
the one and seventy-two hundredths inches of precipitation would 
have flowed toward the defendant's property in gushing quantities 
anyway. The plaintiffs' property, lying on a natural slope, 
would have been the natural recipient of erronxee^ is quantities 
of water during that period of approximately two hours that the 
storm lasted. A record devoid of such necessary evidence cannot 
support a bare finding that the defendant proximately caused the 
injury to the plaintiffs. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the appellant respectfully 
prays this Court to issue its order: 
1. Reversing the trial court's finding that the defendant 
was negligent; or, 
2. Directing the trial court to find the plaintiffs 
contributorily negligent; and, 
3. Reversing the trial court's finding that the defendant 
proximately caused the damage complained of; and, 
4. Reversing the judgment and decision of the trial court, 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, JACKSON & MAYER 
By Joseph E. Jackson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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